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Abstract. 
 In this paper I argue that there are problems with the foundations of the current 
version of physicalism about color. In some sources laying the foundations of physicalism, 
types of surface reflectance corresponding to (veridical) color perceptions are characterized 
by making reference to properties of the observer. This means that these surface attributes 
are not objective (i.e. observer-independent). This problem casts doubt on the possibility 
of identifying colors with types of surface reflectance. If this identification cannot be 
maintained, that in turn threatens representationalist theories of phenomenal 
consciousness: there remains no objective, observer-independent property that color 
experiences represent - hence no representational content, in terms of semantic externalism, 
can be attributed to color experiences. I offer an alternative account of color and conclude 
that further empirical study is required to do justice to the basic claims of color physicalism. 
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1. Introduction: two tasks in establishing physicalism about color 
 Physicalism about color is the thesis that colors simply are external physical 
properties. Though colors are not reducible to (i.e. they do not stand in one-to-one 
correspondence with) microphysical properties, they are physical properties that can be 
realized by more than one type of microphysical constellations (Hilbert, 1987; Matthen, 
1988, p24). Physicalists identify color with surface reflectance (Hilbert, 1987; Byrne and 
Hilbert, 1997; see also Matthen, 1988 p24; Tye, 1995, pp144-150). 
 Establishing color physicalism consists of two theoretical tasks. The first of these 
tasks is to show that our color perceptions, under normal circumstances, are reliably 
correlated with types of surface reflectance. The second task is to argue that phenomenal 
characters of color experiences are, in some way, determined by the physical property these 
experiences stand for. As Byrne and Hilbert put the point (1997, p264), phenomenal 
character and representational content of colors necessarily go together. A stronger claim 
is made by Tye (1995): phenomenal character in general, and color phenomenology in 
particular, is to be identified with certain kind of representational content (see below). So, 
for example, for a perceptual state to be a red-feeling experience is for it to have the 
perceptual (representational) content that a surface with such-and-such a reflectance is 
present (note that surface reflectance can be sensed only by vision). 
 Corresponding to these two tasks, there are two alternatives of physicalism about 
color (e.g. Matthen, 1988, pp24-25). The first alternative asserts that there is no identifiable 
observer-independent property that corresponds to our color sensations - i.e., colors are not 
objective (e.g. Hardin, 1988, 1995). The second alternative says that though perhaps there 
is some objective property that correlates well with color sensations, the phenomenal 
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character of color experiences is 'something more than', or not inherently determined by, 
their objective correlates (see Hilbert, 1987, pp18-22). Color experiences are products of 
the brain, even though they reliably signal external states of affairs. 
 In this paper I will follow the strategy of the first alternative. I will argue that it is 
largely unclear whether the objective property currently specified by color-physicalists (i.e. 
integrated triplets of reflectances; see below) is indeed such that color experiences, under 
normal circumstances, reliably correlate with it. If it turns out that there is no reliable 
correlation between objective types of reflectance and color-perceptions, then the thesis 
asserting a necessary covariation between color content and color phenomenology loses its 
ground as well (unless, of course, physicalists manage to specify another objective property 
that reliably correlates with color perceptions). Arguing for the first alternative is more 
closely related to empirical facts whereas arguments for the independence of color content 
and color phenomenology typically proceed by entertaining possible scenarios in which 
phenomenology varies independently of content, or vice versa (see Byrne and Hilbert, 
1997, 267-272; for a related problem see Davies, 1997). I am not going to argue for the 
second alternative in this paper. 
 The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section I give a very brief 
outline of M. Tye’s representational theory of phenomenal content that relies upon the 
claims of color physicalism. The third section is a summary of the most important part of 
David R. Hilbert’s argument for color physicalism. In the fourth section I give my reasons 
for doubting the correctness of the physicalist view. In section five I sketch an alternative 
account of color – basically a return to a version of subjectivism. 
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2. The theory that phenomenal character is representational content 
 Tye (1995) presents a comprehensive theory of phenomenal consciousness that 
offers an account of basically all aspects and well-known problems of conscious 
experience. Tye’s theory accommodates a great number of empirical findings related to 
consciousness. He claims that phenomenal character in general is identical with a certain 
sort of representational content. To support this claim Tye first argues that, contrary to 
philosophical orthodoxy, every kind of sensory or perceptual experience has 
representational content (Tye, 1995, chapter four). Pains are no exception: they are sensory 
representations of bodily damage or disturbance (p113). In his book Tye endorses a 
covariation theory of representational content (pp100-101), though he includes 
evolutionary history as well as a possible mediator of content (e.g. p153). Hence for him, 
a particular kind of pain typically (i.e. under normal circumstances) covaries with, 
therefore represents that, there is a such-and such disturbance present at such-and-such a 
bodily location. Another example: the content of a particular color-experience is that a 
specific type of surface-reflectance is present. However, not every kind of content is, at the 
same time, some phenomenal character. Belief content, for instance, is not phenomenal. 
Phenomenal character is Poised Abstract Nonconceptual Intentional Content (that 
is, PANIC). The term ‘poised’ means that this sort of content attaches to the maplike 
(spatio-temporally organized) output patterns of sensory or perceptual modules, such that 
these contentful output patterns in turn stand in a position to influence the belief/desire 
system (p138). The term ‘abstract’ (p138) means essentially the same as ‘not object-
involving’ (Davies, 1997, 310; 313-314): quantitative identity does not play a role in the 
identity of contents, only qualitative identity does. Two objects that are exactly alike 
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regarding their perceivable properties can be substituted for each other without altering the 
sensory/perceptual content (hence the phenomenal character) they give rise to. This feature 
is obviously not true of belief content: quantitative identity of the object of belief plays a 
role in determining belief content. ‘Nonconceptual‘ (p139; see also Davies, 1997, 310-311) 
means that the properties that enter into these contents need not be such that the subject 
possesses matching concepts for them. That is, perceptual states carrying PANICs do not, 
all by themselves, constitute concepts.  
The relation between PANIC and phenomenal character is that of metaphysical 
necessity. Being PANIC is not a contingent, superficial attribute of phenomenal character, 
but rather an essential one (Tye, 1995, sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3). Phenomenal character is not 
a multiply realizable abstract kind, one of whose realizations is PANIC. If Tye’s theory is 
right then it is metaphysically necessary that phenomenal character is PANIC (just like 
water is H2O) (p184; pp188-191). An important difference between the water-H2O case 
and the phenomenal experience-PANIC one is that in the former case it is metaphysically 
possible that something with the superficial appearance of water is not H2O whereas in the 
latter case there is no parallel possibility. Phenomenal character is an essential property of 
experiences, not a superficial one. Anything that feels like a pain is a pain (Chalmers, 1996, 
pp146-147; Tye, 1995, p188). To the contrary, being the waterish stuff in our environment 
is a contingent property of H2O. Therefore in the phenomenal character case the only 
relevant possibility that we can claim to really imagine (i.e., entertain as a possibility) is 
that the PANIC theory is wrong. If the PANIC theory is right, then both ‘PANIC R’ and 
‘phenomenal character red’ are rigid designators that pick out the same thing in every 
 7 
possible world. Hence there remains no way to imagine that, even though phenomenal 
character is PANIC in our world, it is something else in another possible world. 
 Within this general framework, Tye offers solutions to all important problems of 
phenomenal consciousness including perspectival subjectivity, phenomenal causation, 
transparency, color inversion and the possibility of zombies, transparency, and so on. 
 
3. The physicalist’s strategy to account for surface metamers 
 According to physicalism about color, colors are surface reflectances. Light-
emitting surfaces (traffic lights, color TVs) are not included in the physicalist account of 
color (see Hilbert, 1987; Byrne and Hilbert, 1997), though sometimes it is mentioned that 
the account of surface color should be extended to include light emitting surfaces as well 
(Hilbert, 1987, p133-134). As long as this extension is not available, the physicalist has an 
excuse for this apparent theoretical gap. The excuse is that, from an evolutionary 
perspective, color vision is principally concerned with distinguishing surfaces that are not 
distinguishable otherwise (e.g. by means of differences in texture). It is surface reflectance 
(i.e. color, in the physicalist’s view) that is essentially represented by color perceptions. 
The proposal that surface reflectance is the main concern of color vision is supported by 
the phenomenon of color constancy (Hilbert, 1987, chapter four). Taking this view to the 
extreme, color TVs, traffic lights and other fancy artifacts create color illusions, that is, 
misrepresentations of true color (Hardin, 1995, p504; Matthen, 1988, p24-25; Tye, 1995, 
p148).1 
 The central problem for the physicalist is to give a coherent account of surface 
metamers – surfaces that have radically different reflectances, yet are indistinguishable to 
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the human color vision system. It may seem that such an account is possible – at least this 
is claimed by Hilbert (1987, chapters five and six). If this account is indeed successful, 
then the first step toward identifying color with surface reflectance is accomplished (see 
the Introduction). In this section I give a brief outline of Hilbert’s solution. In the next 
section I show why his solution is largely problematic. 
 First let us see Hilbert’s account (Hilbert, 1987). As he notes (p72), the physicalist 
about color needs the distinction between real and apparent color. This is so because, 
undeniably, the same surface reflectance can give rise to different color perceptions. If we 
accept that one and the same surface can give rise to different and equally veridical color 
perceptions, then we cannot maintain that color just is surface reflectance, because 
reflectance does not determine our (veridical) color perception. So, even though one and 
the same surface can give rise to different perceptions of color (i.e., under different 
illuminations), only one of these perceptions can be regarded as veridical. 
Sets of surface metamers, i.e., sets of reflectances that are indistinguishable to 
human color vision, are also illumination-dependent. For every pair of reflectances that are 
metamers under standard illumination there exists some rather special (e.g. 
monochromatic) illuminant under which the two reflectances are distinguishable (see e.g. 
Hilbert, 1987, p86-87). In this paper I will only be concerned with sets of reflectances 
members of which are metameric under standard illumination. (I will call such sets MetS 
sets in what follows.) Any two members of a MetS set are distinguishable under certain 
non-standard illuminations. It also follows from what has been said that two members of a 
MetS set, M1 and M2, do not elicit veridical color perceptions in those illumination 
circumstances where they are distinguishable. In other words, they are distinguishable only 
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by means of misperceiving their color; this is a strange consequence of the physicalist 
theory. Given standard illumination, where they are veridically perceived, M1 and M2 are 
indistinguishable. So if they are, in some strange illumination, distinguishable by virtue of 
their hue, then it follows that at least one of them is perceived to have an apparent color, 
not its true one. (It is typical that in such circumstances neither M1 nor M2 are perceived 
veridically – by the just presented idea of veridicality.) (See Hilbert, 1987, p90, p130; at 
these places he argues that this problem exists only for dispositionalist accounts of color. I 
think it cannot be avoided in Hilbert’s physicalist account either.) 
 Now, take a MetS set, say the one members of which are the determinate hue red16. 
Let us call it MetS(red16). MetS(red16) has infinitely many members. All members of 
MetS(red16) are reflectances that are examples of the color red16, and they are only perceived 
veridically when they are perceived as red16 – that is, as indistinguishable from each other. 
This line of thought suggests that all members of a MetS set are one and the same color. 
 However, there is another line of argument in the physicalist theory. To escape from 
the dispositionalist’s definition of color (i.e., that colors are color perceptions of some 
standard observer; p98), the objectivist takes every single surface reflectance to be a 
distinct color (p83; p98). But then, members of, say, MetS(red16) are, by definition, 
different colors. 
 This apparent contradiction is solved by an ingenious move (in chapter six). Hilbert 
goes along with his definition maintaining that members of MetS sets are indeed different 
colors. Why can’t they be perceived as different then? Because the resolution of the human 
color vision system (over the range of surface spectral reflectances – SSRs) is pretty coarse. 
Human color vision is a passive reflectance-measuring device that works under whatever 
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illumination is available and uses receptors with various spectral sensitivities (p103-105). 
But it has only three kinds of such receptors (i.e. short, middle and long wave sensitive 
cones). Apparently, such a device cannot be very good at finely distinguishing reflectances. 
Now, every measuring device has some standard error; any output of such a device 
corresponds to, or signals, only a class of determinate values that are measured. We do not 
perceive the length of objects with absolute precision; indeed, there presumably are many 
more objective, determinate lengths than different length perceptions (perceptual states 
representing different lengths). Every veridical perception of length informs us only that 
there is an object present whose length is in such-and-such a range. Many different, 
maximally determinate, objective lengths are capable of being represented by any 
particular length perception. These lengths have a common property: the difference 
between any two of them is smaller than a certain limit. Measurements and perceptions of 
quantitative properties are not absolutely precise; however, this indeterminacy of 
measurement does not impair its objectivity (p106). 
 The same holds for color perception. Not only is it not absolutely exact, it is actually 
fairly crude. It does not impose a very fine division on the range of reflectances. Any 
veridical color perception informs us only that a reflectance in a certain (quite broad) range 
is present. Though every different reflectance is a different color, many different, 
maximally determinate, objective colors are capable of being represented by any particular 
color sensation. The analogy with perception of length is exact; this shows that there simply 
is no important difference here between the perception of primary qualities and that of 
allegedly secondary ones. The difference that we find between color and length perception 
is a difference in degree, not in kind. 
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 In addition, any MetS set has a property that is true of all and only the members of 
that set. This property is not disjunctive, contrary to what certain philosophers assert (p110-
111). It is an objective property; however, it is a highly derivative one. Common properties 
corresponding to MetS sets are uninteresting ones; they are ‘unnatural kinds’, despite their 
objectivity. Still, they are out there, independently of any perceiver. This view is called 
anthropocentric realism about color (Hilbert, 1987, pp13-15; p115; pp119-120). Human 
color vision singles out bunches or ranges of surface reflectances (maximally determinate 
colors), such that every range singled out has a common objective property. 
 The common property that characterizes MetS sets is integrated triplets of 
reflectances, or ITRs (p111). It can be obtained in the following way. Take the ranges of 
sensitivity of the three kinds of retinal cones: it is approximately from 400 to 525 nm for 
short-wave cones, from 435 to 640 nm for middle-wave cones, and from 450 to 680 nm for 
long-wave cones (see e.g. DeValois and DeValois, 1997, fig. 4.1 on p99). Take a colored 
surface; integrate its surface reflectance above the sensitivity range of the short wave cones 
(400-525nm). (I.e., add up the reflectances obtained for every adjacent, very narrow band 
of wavelength within that range.) This gives the first member of the ITR of the colored 
surface under examination. Repeat the same procedure for the remaining two sensitivity 
ranges, thereby obtaining the other two members of the triplet. It is claimed that basically 
every member of a given MetS set has the same ITR whereas members of different MetS 
sets have different ITRs.2 ITRs are perfectly objective, perceiver-independent properties, 
just like individual, determinate reflectances. So, due to the crudeness of our color vision, 
different objective colors that have the same ITR are perceived as the same color.3 So we 
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get the objective property of surface color. As Byrne and Hilbert put the point (1997, p266; 
their italics): 
The reflectance-types that the human visual system represents objects as having are 
considerably coarser than the maximally specific colors. Hence, although of course 
objects having maximally specific colors are visible, the maximally specific colors 
themselves are not, because they are not properties that one can tell an object 
possesses simply by looking at it. 
 
4. What is the problem with the objectivist account of surface color? 
 Hilbert mentions (p111, footnote 9) that in order for ITRs to (approximately) 
uniquely characterize MetS sets, the calculation has to be slightly modified. We have to 
weigh the integration of reflectances above ranges of receptor sensitivity with the values 
characterizing receptor sensitivity at the corresponding points within the sensitivity range. 
That is, what we integrate is not reflectance functions, but products of spectral sensitivity 
functions (of receptors) and surface reflectance functions (see McCann et al., 1976, Part 
II, esp. p451). I will call this modified measure weighted integrated triples of reflectances, 
or WITRs. However innocent this modification might seem, it is not. Here is why. 
 ITRs are objective, that is, observer-independent properties of surfaces exactly 
because their derivation does not include, or make reference to, any parameter 
characterizing the observer. Surface spectral reflectances (SSRs) are mind-independent: 
they just are out there in external reality. ITRs are observer-independent as well: every 
determinate SSR uniquely determines exactly one ITR – this fact is totally unrelated to any 
observer. However, WITRs are not out there in physical reality, independently of 
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observers. A determinate SSR has no determinate, observer-independent WITR. It has 
infinitely many, merely possible WITRs – depending on what sort of organism happens to 
perceive it. To put this another way: if an abstract SSR-property is instantiated then the 
corresponding abstract ITR-property is instantiated as well. However, from the 
instantiation of an SSR-property, the instantiation of no WITR-property will follow. So, 
what is the common property of MetS sets? Their ITR? Probably not: there presumably is 
only a crude, by-and-large correspondence between ITRs and MetS sets. Then is WITR the 
property that characterizes a given MetS set? This sounds more plausible, but WITRs are 
not at all objective, observer-independent properties. They are complex properties derived 
both from properties of surfaces and those of observers. Therefore they are observer-
dependent. 
An experimental test of the predictions of Land’s Retinex Theory is done by 
McCann et al. (1976; see also Land, 1977). In Part II of their paper, the authors examine 
the hypothesis that color sensations are determined by triplets of lightnesses and that these 
lightnesses in turn correspond to integrated triplets of reflectances (p448). As they 
summarize the results: ‘Our results show that the color sensations are very highly correlated 
with the triplets of reflectance’ (p446). 
In the first part of their experiment, the authors asked their subjects to choose from 
the Munsell Book of Color the colored chips that best matched the color of each area in the 
so-called Color Mondrian display used in Land’s experiments on color constancy (Land, 
1977, 1997; McCann et al. 1976, p446). In the second part, the reflectances of areas in the 
Mondrian display and the matching Munsell chips were compared. The crucial question 
was: are the ITRs of a Mondrian area and the Munsell chip chosen as the same in color the 
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same or close to one another? However, the authors did not even examine the hypothesis 
that pure ITRs of Mondrian areas and the Munsell chips chosen to match them are 
approximately the same. They began their examination by testing  WITRs (p449). It is 
important to note that the sensitivity of each type of cone pigment varies considerably with 
wavelength (McCann, 1976, fig. 4. on p449; DeValois and DeValois, 1997, p99), that is, 
weighting with pigment sensitivity brings in a factor that does not at all seem negligible. 
Even more surprisingly, the authors introduce another transformation: a psychophysical 
rescaling of the WITRs. This transformation is nonlinear (it is a power function: p450) and 
it is there to compensate for the fact that equal increments in reflectance do not represent 
equal increments in sensation (p449). So apparently we have a psychophysical sensitivity 
function here whose exponent is there to characterize the sensitivity of the perceiver to the 
particular kind of stimulus in question. That is, there are two different parameters 
characterizing the observer included in the derivation of the property common between 
matching Mondrian areas and Munsell chips. The result is the so-called scaled (weighted) 
integrated (triplets of) reflectances (see also Land, 1977, pp116-118), or SWITRs. For 
every Mondrian area, and its matching Munsell chip, SWITRs are very close to one 
another. For WITRs (unscaled) the fit is looser though still quite good (see McCann et al. 
1976, figures 6 and 7 on page 450; Land, 1977, fig. on p116). No examination of 
unweighted ITRs is mentioned in the McCann et al. paper; the same is true of Land’s own 
experiments (Land, 1977, pp116, 117-118). Given the concerns of color physicalists, and 
the theoretical considerations that I have offered in this section, an experiment is needed to 
establish to what extent two surfaces matching in perceivable color have the same - 
unscaled, unweighted - ITR (or any other observer-independent measure). Such an 
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experiment could do justice to the physicalist claim that perceivable color is, or can 
possibly be, an objective property. As long as data reinforcing the physicalist are not 
available I assume that ITR is not a property that truly characterizes MetS sets. If this is 
indeed the case then the physicalist owes us a new specification of some common objective 
property of MetS sets. In the next section I examine what consequences would it have if 
we could not find such a common objective property. I will also attempt to motivate the 
claim that for color vision to be successful no such property is needed. 
 
5. Rough sketch of an alternative view 
 As we have seen, there is no known property such that it satisfies the two conditions 
of (i) being objective, and (ii) being true of all and only the members of a given MetS set. 
The only known properties that satisfy (ii) (i.e., WITRs, or SWITRs) aren’t objective. They 
are observer-dependent. Hence, taking only observer-independent properties into account, 
the division of the visible range of SSRs into MetS sets seems entirely arbitrary. If there is 
indeed no objective property that properly characterizes MetS sets, then we arrive at the 
following view. (This is the view I am inclined to defend.) Color vision creates the joints 
for itself when carving up the relevant aspect of nature. Mechanisms of color vision do 
indeed divide the visible range of surface reflectances into distinct ranges (MetS sets). The 
division itself (or the boundaries it outlines), separated from the properties of observers, is 
not marked by any objective feature of reality. This division cuts in the middle of a 
homogeneous continuum, not along any preexisting objective border.  
 To extend this view slightly, here is an evolutionary consideration. It may well be 
true that, evolutionarily speaking, color vision is mainly concerned with surface 
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discrimination. However, in this particular case (introducing distinctions within the realm 
of SSRs), evolution need not care about singling out objective properties - either natural or 
unnatural, highly derivative kinds. All evolution needs to care about is that color vision 
assign values (perceptual states) to surfaces of different reflectance such that these 
assignments are stable over time. A particular surface has to be perceived as the same in 
color at different times (in normal circumstances). As long as the internal parameters 
guiding the dissection of the range of visible SSRs (e.g. the spectral sensitivity profiles of 
retinal pigments) are stable over time, this constraint is not violated (see Shepard, 1997, 
pp326-329 for a similar idea). For discrimination and recognition, introducing arbitrary 
(though stable) sets of reflectances is enough. For color vision to achieve its goal, common 
objective properties that characterize MetS sets are unnecessary. Arbitrary sets of 
reflectances that hang together only by virtue of some observer-dependent property suffice 
for consistent surface-discrimination.4 In general, dividing continua of stimuli into separate 
bands or ranges, grouping and scaling them in some arbitrary (even disjunctive) way is 
already a huge help to the organism in guiding its behavior and orienting in its environment 
(see Shepard, 1997, pp346-347). 
I hasten to note that this feature of color vision need not generalize to all other 
aspects of perception. In the case of shape or length perception it is plausible that objective 
properties are singled out by the visual system. But perhaps in certain cases of perception, 
the ranges of phenomena carved out by distinct perceptual states are not properly 
characterized by any common objective property. 
This view of color, if correct, has nasty consequences for representationalist 
theories of phenomenal consciousness. According to realist and semantic externalist 
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criteria, an inner state has representational content only if it has a proper causal connection 
with a non-disjunctive objective property (Tye, 1995, pp194-195 and endnote 4 on p228). 
My argument against color physicalism suggests that there may be no objective and non-
disjunctive property that color experiences are reliably correlated with. This in turn entails 
that, according to externalist criteria of content, color-experiences simply have no 
representational content. They do not stand for any objective kind (non-disjunctive 
property), however derivative and uninteresting. This lack of representational content 
satisfies Tye’s own falsification condition (endnote 4 on p228) for his representational 
theory of phenomenal experience, hence it knocks down his theory altogether. If there is 
just one case in which phenomenal character is not identical to representational content in 
the semantic externalist sense, then the identity of content and phenomenology cannot be 
metaphysically necessary. Phenomenal character just isn’t representational content – it is 
something else. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Not jumping to grandiose conclusions before testing them properly, I end this paper 
by suggesting that the way color physicalism is currently argued for should be subject to 
further empirical scrutiny. By no means does it seem entirely clear that the ‘colors are 
reflectances’ claim – in its present form at least - can be maintained. 
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photoreceptors is not capable of mapping ‘natural’ SSRs properly – the further compression to three 
dimensions of color that we experience cannot be attributed to a property of the surfaces themselves, but 
rather, it must be imposed by our visual system (p327). However, natural conditions of lighting can be 
characterized by just three degrees of freedom (or three independent basis functions: pp323-324). 
Furthermore, color vision systems with just three spectrally distinct photoreceptors can achieve color 
constancy in natural lighting whose variability is due to no more than three main independent factors. 
Therefore, as Shepard suggests, ‘…the principal criterion of success of the visual system’s chromatic analysis 
is not that it represent the full complexity of the spectral reflectance function for each surface…’ but that, 
despite the degenerate representation of SSRs, ‘the color that we do perceive is nevertheless the same color 
each time we view the same surface’ (p328). 
 
